In this note we generalize a numerical algorithm presented in [9] 
Introduction
In the last decades, there is an increased interest in studying diverse problems in economics and optimal control theory using dynamic games. In particular, in environmental economics and macroeconomic policy coordination, dynamic games are a natural framework to model policy coordination problems (see e.g. the books and references in [6] , [19] , [29] and [15] ). In engineering the theory is used to model problems in, e.g., finance, robust optimal control and pursuitevasion problems. Particularly in the area of robust optimal control the theory of linear quadratic differential games has been extensively developed (see, e.g., [1] , [21] and [3] ). In engineering applications, using this framework, are reported from diverse areas (robot control formation [16] , interconnection of electric power systems [26] , multipath routing in communication networks [23] , solving mixed H 2 /H ∞ control problems [24] ).
In the theory of linear quadratic differential games the environment is modeled by a set of linear differential equations and the objectives are modeled as functions containing just affine quadratic terms. Assuming that players don't cooperate and look for linear feedback strategies which lead to a worse performance if they unilaterally deviate from it, leads to the study of so-called linear feedback Nash equilibria (FNE). These strategies have the important property that they are strong time consistent. A property which, e.g., does not hold under an open-loop information structure (see, e.g., [2, Chapter 6.5] ). This problem has been considered by many authors and dates back to the seminal work of Starr and Ho [30] . For the fixed finite planning horizon there exists at most one FNE (see e.g. [25] , [27] ). Whether a solution exists depends on the solvability of a related set of coupled Riccati-type differential equations. Global existence and convergence properties of solutions of these differential equations have, e.g., been studied in [28] , [14] and [32] . Further, the problem of calculating the solutions of these differential equations was considered in, e.g., [5] and [18] . In both [2, Section 6.5] and [10, Chapter 8] one can find additional references and generalizations of these results.
For an infinite planning horizon, the affinequadratic differential game is solved in [12] . To find the FNE in this game involves solving a set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations. Only a few existence results are known for some special cases of these equations (see, e.g., [11] for an overview). Moreover, for the multivariable case there are no computational algorithms available which provide all equilibrium points. Some iterative schemes have been proposed in literature to find an equilibrium for some special cases (see e.g. [20] , [31] , [27] and [22] ). However, all of them just provide one equilibrium (if convergence occurs). Since the number of equilibria can vary between zero and infinity it is clear that, particularly when there is no additional information that a certain type of equilibrium point is preferred or the number of equilibria is unknown, one would like to have an overview of all possible equilibria.
[28] considered a geometric approach for calculating the stabilizing solutions of a set of feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations. In that approach subspaces have to be calculated which satisfy simultaneously some invariance properties. However, up to now, it is unknown how to find these subspaces.
Also for the scalar case these set of equations can have multiple solutions. For instance, for the most simple two-player scalar case where the performance criterion is a strict positive quadratic function of both states and controls, the game can have one up to three different solutions (see [7] or [10] [Chapter 8.4], or [8] for the corresponding N-player game result). In [9] (or [10] [Chapter 8.5]) a numerical algorithm, based on the calculation of invariant subspaces for a certain matrix, was given to calculate all equilibria for this special scalar game.
In this note we generalize the approach taken in [9] to find all FNE for the affine-quadratic N-player scalar case. The algorithm we will present is based on determining the real positive roots and corresponding nullspaces of a polynomial matrix that can be derived from the with this game associated set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations. The approach generalizes the approach taken in [9] .
This note is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem and some notation. The main result of the paper is stated in Section 3. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. In the Appendix we provide details on the derivation of the polynomial matrix which is essential in solving the problem.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the set of algebraic Riccati equations that play an essential role in finding the FNE for the linear affine-quadratic differential game. Since the same equations occur in solving a simplified version of this game we will consider this simplified game here. Consider the next N-person linear quadratic differential game, with dynamicṡ
and where player i wishes to choose his control u i ∈ IR m i to minimize:
Here
. . .
Notice that we make no definiteness assumptions w.r.t. matrix Q i and that the minimization problem has no solution if R ii is an indefinite matrix, i.e. if R ii has one or more negative eigenvalues.
1N := {1,··· ,N} and A > 0 means that matrix A is positive definite.
The linear feedback information structure of the game means that all players know at any point in time the current state of the system and the cost function of their opponents. Furthermore, the set of admissible control actions, U s , are linear functions of the current state of the system 2 , i.e.:
Here B is the block-row matrix B :
To assure that U s is nonempty we assume (A, B) to be stabilizable. Notice that the assumption that the players use simultaneously stabilizing controls introduces the cooperative meta-objective of all players to stabilize the system (see, e.g., the introduction of Sections 7.2 and 7.4 of [10] for a discussion).
Then, u * ∈ U s is called a FNE if the usual inequalities apply, i.e., no player can improve his performance by a unilateral deviation from this set of equilibrium actions. Introducing the notation u * −i (α) := u * where u * i has been replaced by the arbitrary input function α the formal definition reads as follows
, where x(.) satisfies (1) with x(t 0 ) = x 0 , and the input α is such that u * −i (α) ∈ U s . To facilitate a brief statement of the next Theorem 2.3 we use some shorthand notation.
Notation 2.2 diag(D i ) is the block-diagonal matrix where the i th diagonal block-entry equals D i . B is the block-diagonal matrix B
I n is the n × n identity matrix; E i+1 is obtained from the block-column matrix containing N + 1 zero blocks, where block i + 1 is replaced by the identity matrix, i.e.
The linear quadratic differential game (1, 2) has a FNE (F 1 , · · · , F N ) for every initial state if and only if
2 σ (H) denotes the spectrum of matrix H;
Here K i , i ∈N, are symmetric solutions of the coupled algebraic Riccati-type equations
The algorithm
From Theorem 2.3 it follows that the solvability of (4) plays a crucial role in finding all FNE. For special cases of (4) it has been shown that these equations may have no, one, or more than one set of stabilizing solutions (see e.g. [10, Chapter 8] ). For the scalar case where all entries in the cost functions, except Q i and R ii , are zero, an eigenvalue based approach was used in [9] to find all solutions of (4). In this section we generalize this eigenvalue based approach to calculate all stabilizing solutions of (4).
To stress we consider the scalar case, we will use lower-case notation. 
The above equations (5) constitute a set of N polynomial equations f i in N unknowns y 1 , · · · , y N , i.e.,
For all i ∈N the degree 3 , d i , of f i is two. Consequently, if the solution set of (5) is a zero-dimensional set, an upper bound is given by the Bézout number convention, let y [1] = y and y [0] = 1. Furthermore, let U(λ k ) denote a matrix polynomial in λ where the greatest degree of the polynomials appearing as entries of U is k. The algorithm is based on the next theorem which proof is provided in [13] . 
Step 2:
Step 3: For all λ i ∈ Λ repeat the following steps.
3.1: Calculate the eigenspace of U(λ N i ).

3.2: If the dimension of the eigenspace is one proceed with Step 3.3, else terminate the algorithm. 3.3: Calculate an eigenvector v of U(λ
N i ). Let v =: [v 0 , · · · , v N , v N+1 , · · · ] T . Then k i := v i v 0si , i ∈N,
is a candidate solution of (4). Verify by substituting k i into (4), whether it solves (4).
Step 4: end of algorithm.
In case Algorithm 3.2 is completed successfully one has found all solutions of (4). Clearly a more detailed study of the structure of matrix U(λ N ) is needed to get more insight into the question how restrictive the invertibility assumptions we made are. Furthermore, the degree of the characteristic polynomial in Step 2 is 2 N , conform its dimension. So, also from a numerical point of view, a more detailed analysis of this structure might help to study problems involving more than ten players. Another point that needs further attention is the case that the dimension of the eigenspace in Step 3.2 is larger than one. This is in particular important for providing an estimate of the number of solutions. One way to proceed may be to consider in such a case a basis for the eigenspace and use the structure of vector v to find then all solutions of (5). This issue is, as already mentioned above, beyond the scope of this paper. Example 3.3 Consider 2 players who like to track a predefined signal w(.), for the systemṡ(t) = s(t) + u 1 (t) + u 2 (t). The players base their actions on the gap x(t) := s(t) − w(t) between the signal and system. Player i controls u i and wants to achieve tracking at minimal cost J i . So he has an incentive to shift the burden of tracking the system to the other 
(t), where c(t) := w(t) − w(t) and x(0)
= s(0) − w(0). Assume c(t) ∈ L 2 (0, ∞). Then, with A = 1, B = [1 1], M 1 = diag(1, 1, 1 2 ), M 2 = diag(2,1 + k 1 + k 2 )k 1 − k 2 1 − 1 − 1 2 k 2 2 = 0 and 2(−1 + k 1 + k 2 )k 2 − k 2 2 − 2 −
Kc(s)ds.
In case the signal w(t) = e −µt and s(0) = 0, we obtain from the above equation that, with c(s) = (1 + µ)e −µt , a = λ and b = −0.4110, the FNE are
e −µt and
respectively. From the cost functions we infer that player 2 has the incentive to achieve accurate tracking with as much as possible control used by player 1. This is confirmed in Figure 1 . Player 2 uses the first period most control in order to achieve good tracking. This point is illustrated in the left-hand panel. After t = 0.2 this role is shifted to player 1. The right-hand panel provides a complete picture. Furthermore, we see from this plot that some overreaction occurs.
Concluding Remarks
In this note we considered a numerical algorithm to calculate all feedback Nash equilibria of the regular indefinite infinite-planning horizon linear-quadratic differential game. To that end we had to trace all stabilizing solutions of a set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations. For the scalar case we indicated a numerical algorithm by which in most cases all solutions of the algebraic Riccati-type equations can be calculated. The algorithm is based on determining the real positive eigenvalues and corresponding eigenspace of a 2 N × 2 N polynomial matrix that has degree N. To determine the points where the polynomial matrix becomes singular, we calculated the roots of its determinant. This determinant is an 2 N order polynomial. A more detailed study of this algorithm and a numerical stable implementation of it remains a topic of future research.
Appendix
In this appendix we describe the construction of matrix U(λ ). Due to space limitations we will not provide details. A formal proof that this construction actually works is provided in [13] .
The construction can be split into three parts. In part one a set of matrices is constructed which can be done independent of the specific example we consider. These matrices model some general calculation rules which are used in parts two and three, where the for the example relevant matrix U is constructed.
Part I. Let y [i]
− j denote the vector that contains the entries of y [i] except the monomials that contain y j and, with w 2 := y 2 , w i+2 := [y 2 1 y
Then, our first calculation rule formalizes that the product of any vector y [ j] by a scalar y k can be obtained by selecting appropriate entries from y [ j+1] and w j+1 . That is: for every k and j construct matrices C 1, j,k and C 2, j,k such that:
Our second calculation rule formalizes that the vector w m+3 can be obtained by selecting in an appropriate way entries from the vectors w m+2 that are multiplied by the scalar y k . That is: for every m construct matrices D k,m+2 such that:
Part II. In this part we describe how recursively a number of matrices can be constructed that are required in Part III to construct matrix U. For the initialization of the process, we introduce some helpful shorthand notation. Let Q be a square matrix with entries q i j . 
and
Lemma 4.1 shows how, recursively, vectors w i+2 , i = 0, · · · , N − 1 are a linear combination (where the coefficients are polynomials in λ ) of the vectors y [ j] , j ∈ i + 2.
such that:
Here, with P 0,2 := −C −1 
